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1 Introduction
This paper represents another step in the enterprise of characterizing linguis-
tic phenomena and their implications for theories of discourse. The particular
phenomenon to be discussed is textual use of this and that. Such usage is very
common, although apparently not encouraged: Strunk & White in their Ele-
ments of Style (3rd Edition) warn writers:
This. The pronoun this, referring to the complete sense of a pre-
ceding sentence or clause, cannot always carry the load and so may
produce an imprecise statement.
However, despite this warning, there is ample data for examining textual use
of this and that and its implications for theories of discourse.
The theories of discourse that seem to me most cognitively plausible are ones
that take its most common features as following from two separate factors:
1. speakers' intentions that take more than one sentence to describe;
2. independent attentional mechanisms that enable information to be con-
veyed linguistically with minimal lexical effort.
Speakers can, in part, manipulate listeners' attention through their text, thereby
changing the context in which subsequent text will be understood. (See Fig-
ure 1.) In this view, an account of this and that addresses the pair of questions:
• How does text change context in such a way that context provides an
interpretation for this and that ?1
• How are instances of this and that in text processed such that their in-
tended interpretations are found?
In this paper, I try to provide an initial answer to both these questions, and in
doing so, place some additional requirements on theories of discourse.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section (Section 2), I review
the constructs that current discourse theories provide for describing context and
1 Steve Isard [Isard75] is the first person I know of to have asked this question (in general,
not just for deictics), thereby going beyond the question standardly addressed by formal
semanticists like Montague of how context affects interpretation.
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Figure 1: Text and Context
changes in context. In Section 3, I try to give a more precise characterization
of the phenomenon that Strunk & White loosely describe as "referring to the
complete sense of a preceding sentence or clause". In Section 4, I then propose
an account of how this and that achieve their intended interpretations, and
finally, in Section 5, I describe both the advantages of this approach and some
complicating factors.
2 Context and Context Change
Theories of discourse understanding give us three different sorts of constructs
for describing context and its changes: discourse entities, discourse segments
and attention. Each has a rather different history and purpose, which I will
describe briefly in turn.
2.1 Discourse Entities
Discourse entities seem to have been first introduced by Lauri Kartunnen in
1976 [Kart76] under the name discourse referent, to provide a uniform way of
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explaining what it is that noun phrases and pronouns in a discourse refer to.
That is, noun phrases should not be taken to refer to things in the world, but
rather to (mental) entities in a listener's evolving model of the discourse, often
called simply a discourse model [Webb82, Garn87]. Discourse entities may cor-
respond to something in the outside world, but they do not have to. Minimally,
theories hold that discourse entities are evoked into a listener's discourse model
in response to the listener's interpreting noun phrases in a text, but theories
differ somewhat in what they take to be the precise relationship between text
and discourse entities. In theories that posit discourse entities, the term refer is
often used to mean "refer in the discourse model" and not "refer in the outside
world". Referent then means the entity in the model picked out by a linguistic
expression. This is the usage I have adopted in this paper.
The basic features of a discourse entity are that (a) it is a constant within
the current discourse model and that (b) one can attribute to it, inter alia,
properties and relationships with other entities. (It is for this reason that Bill
Woods once called them "conceptual coathooks".) In some theories, different
parts of the discourse model (often called spaces) correspond to portions of the
text or discourse with different modalities, including hypotheticals, counterfac-
tuals, beliefs of different agents, etc. Depending on which space in the model
is currently active (under construction), the same noun phrase (e.g., "the key")
or pronoun (e.g., "it") may refer to very different discourse entities.
2.2 Discourse Segments
The second construct available for describing context and changes in context is
the discourse segment. While discourse segmentation is generally taken to be a
chunking of a linguistic text into sequences of related clauses or sentences, as
James Allen has noted:
... there is little consensus on what the segments of a particular
discourse should be or how segmentation could be accomplished.
One reason for this lack of consensus is that there is no precise
definition of what a segment is beyond the intuition that certain
sentences naturally group together [Allen87, p. 398-9]
Beyond this common intuition, intuitions vary: among computational lin-
guists, Grosz & Sidner [GS85] have taken a discourse segment to be a chunk of
text that expresses a common purpose (what they have called a discourse seg-
ment purpose) with respect to the speaker's plans; Hobbs et al. [HMSE88] have
taken a discourse segment to be a chunk of text that has a common meaning;
while Nakhimovsky [Nakh88], considering only narrative, has taken a discourse
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Figure 2: Simple Discourse Segmentation
segment to be a chunk of text that describes a single event from a single per-
spective. Theories also differ as to their minimal discourse segment. Hobbs
takes it to be a sentence, and Polanyi [Pola86]' a clause. Grosz & Sidner seem
to take a sentence as the minimal segment needed to express a single purpose,
but do not assume that every sentence constitutes a distinct discourse segment.
In general, the notion of discourse segment has been defined recursively, such
that a discourse segment is either
1. a minimal discourse segment
2. a sequence of discourse segments.2
The resulting segmentation of a text will therefore be describable as a set of
embedding structures or trees. A simple discourse structure is illustrated as an
embedding structure in Figure 2a, and as a tree in Figure 2b. '
2 As Passonneau has pointed out (personal correspondence), this ignores the possibility of
interpreting a stretch of text as belonging to two adjacent segments in a sequence, serving
essentially as a transition between them. Including this possibility complicates what it would
m.ean to have a sequence of discourse segments, but would not alter the recursive nature of
the definition itself.
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Figure 3: Addition of nodes by Attachment
If one wants to take discourse segmentation as a factor in context change,
then it cannot be done post facto, after a text has been read and understood: it
must be doable on-line. While characterizing the features of this process is an
area of active research (cf.[GS85]' [HL87], [Cohen87], [Reich]), for the purposes
of this paper, I will assume that it can be described in 'tree'-terms as follows:
• Multi-clause segments correspond to non-terminal nodes of the tree, and
single-clause segments to ternunal nodes.3
• To start, an initial root node is established. (This will not necessarily be
the final root node after segmentation is complete.)
• Clauses are processed in linear order.
• A new single-clause segment (terminal node) is added to the growing tree
in one of two ways: by attachment or by adjunction:
A node is attached to an existing non-terminal node by making it the
new rightmost daughter of that node. (See Figure 3.)
A node Cj is adjoined to an existing non-terminal node Si by creating
a new non-terminal node Sk and attaching Si as its left daughter and
Cj as its right daughter. If Si was the root node, Sk becomes the
new one (See Figure 4a.) If Si was an internal node, then Sk replaces
Si in the tree. (See Figure 4b.)
A node Cj is adjoined to an existing terminal node Ci by creating
a new non-terminal node Sk, inserting it in the tree in place of Ci ,
attaching Ci as its left daughter and Cj as its right daughter. (See
Figure 4c.)
Where and how a new clause is attached depends on what clauses it "naturally
groups together with" , in terms of its meaning, purpose, viewpoint, etc., in ways
3 This simplifies the tree by eliminating single branching structures of single-clause segment
nodes going to clause nodes. Unfortunately, this presentational simplification is at the expense
of somewhat complicating the algorithm.
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Figure 4: Addition of nodes by Adjunction
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that are currently the focus of active research, as noted above.4
In any case, my assumption that on-line discourse segmentation resembles
this type of tree-construction process has the following consequences:
• It is only segments on the right frontier of the tree that are involved in
the attachment or adjunction of a new clause/segment. (For example,
in Figure 2, at the point of processing clause C j +1 , the right frontier
comprises segments {Sk21j, Sk21, Sk2, Sk}.) These are the segn1ents whose
meaning, purpose, etc. the listener can be taken as actively attending to.5
• Adjoining a new clause/segment may involve tree restructuring as the ex-
isting daughters of a node are grouped together as a segment unto them-
selves. Thus the discourse segmentation may change over time.
Notice that it is still a separate question as to how segmentation relates to
context, in the sense of Figure 1. For example, if segmentation simply produces
larger chunks of meaning, it may not affect context beyond simply adding to it.
On the other hand, if it in1poses a structure on context it may affect the use and
interpretation of other linguistic devices. For example, Grosz [Grosz81], Reich-
man [Reich] and Grosz & Sidner [GS85] have argued that discourse segmen-
tation indirectly constrains the interpretation of definite noun phrases. Other
researchers ([Nakh88,Webb87,Webb88]) have argued that through a Temporal
Focus associated with a segment, segmentation constrains the interpretation of
tense. Now in this paper, I will argue that the mental correlates of discourse
segments have another effect on context - then1selves providing referents for the
deictic pronouns this and that.
2.3 Attention
The third sort of construct provided by theories of discourse for describing
changes in context is the listener's attention. This appears in theories in various
4By assuming that a new clause/segment is immediately attached into a growing structure,
I am ignoring the interesting possibility that "growing" constituents might in part be separated
from deciding where to attach them in the tree, as in Marcus's deterministic parser [Marcus79].
5 I believe this corresponds to the intuition behind Grosz & Sidner's stack representation of
Attentional State, cf. Section 2.3. (Any directed path through a tree from root to tip can be
represented as a stack.) In any case, the rest of a discourse segmentation tree may well blur
out of a listener's awareness, with the result that the tree as an instantiated data structure
may actually only be an artifact of post hoc analysis. In fact, it is not even clear how much
of a right frontier a listener can be taken as actively attending to at anyone time, such that
there is some linguistic property that all segments on this frontier share. My data here on
deixis can be interpreted as arguing for three or four segments, but further study on this and
other aspects of attention in discourse are clearly needed.
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guises:
• Foreground/Background [HoppT80, Givon87]
• States of Activation [Chafe87]
• Focusing [Grosz81]
• Attentional State [GS85]
• Centering [GJW83]
All of these notions have been explicitly proposed, at least in part, to account
for patterns of concept verbalization - for example, when the pronunciation of
concept descriptions can be attenuated, when concepts can be specified using
explicit pronouns or zero-anaphors, when an unmodified definite noun phrase
can be used to refer to a concept, when particular intonation structures and/or
marked syntactic constructs are appropriate, etc. Three of these notions I will
now describe in more detail, as they will be relevant later in the paper.
Chafe proposes [Chafe87] that a concept (objects, events, and properties)
may have one of three activation states:
active - A concept that is currently "in a person's focus of consciousness"
because of its recent explicit verbalization. In such a state, a concept can
be verbalized in a very reduced way (e.g., with an unstressed pronoun, a
zero anaphor, etc.)
semi-active - A concept in a person's "peripheral consciousness" (i.e., of which
s/he has "background awareness") either because of belonging to "a set
of expectations associated with a schema" evoked by a text or because of
having been active but not being "refreshed". In this state, a concept can
be verbalized as an unmodified definite noun phrase.
inactive - A concept in a person's long-term memory that is neither active nor
semi-active. Concepts in this state will be verbalized with indefinite noun
phrases or modified definite noun phrases.
Thus in Chafe's model, a listener's attention to concepts reflects both their
recency of mention and a block structure associated with whatever schema is
currently active.
In Grosz & Sidner's model [GS85], a listener's attention correlates with the
perceived structure of the discourse. In particular, there is a focus space as-
sociated with each discourse segment, as well as a discourse segment purpose
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or DSP, as noted earlier. Corresponding to a tree hierarchy of DSPs (which
they call Intentional Structure), there is a stack of focus spaces, representing
the listener's A ttentional State. The focus spaces on the stack correspond to the
discourse segments whose DSPs are on the right frontier of Intentional Struc-
ture. Given this, a concept's activation correlates with its focus space's position
in the stack: ones in the focus space at the top of the stack are most "activated".
Hence, an unmodified noun phrase is more likely to pick up its referent from
a segment closer to the top of the stack than one further down. Picking up a
referent from further down in the stack may, in fact, indicate that the segments
higher up the stack can now to be taken as "closed", with attention shifting
back to a more inclusive segment. (Other researchers relating some notion of
activation with segmentation are [Reich] and [Fox87].)
Grosz, Joshi & Weinstein [GJW83] attempt to account for more local prop-
erties of a listener's attention. In their centering theory, at any point in a
discourse following its initial clause, there is a distinguished entity called the
backwards-looking center (Cb) and an ordered list of entities, including Cb, called
forward-looking centers (CJ ). CJ includes all entities that have been mentioned
either explicitly or implicitly in the previous clause, and their ordering reflects,
in large part, their syntactic position in that clause. Because of this recency
of mention, a listener is assumed to be actively aware of all of them. The C b
is distinguished from the other members of CJ by being the one the speaker
is assumed to be talking about (focussed on), while the others are what the
speaker may go on to talk about. Because of this, while it will be possible
to refer pronominally to any member of CJ by virtue of recency, a subsequent
clause will sound most natural (i.e., will be most easily processed) if
1. the current Cb, if referred to, is referred to pronominally;
2. any other member of the current CJ is referenced pronominally only if the
current Cb is not mentioned in the clause or if it is referenced pronominally
as well.
As I will discuss further in Section 4, what is for me significant about this
centering theory is that (1) there is one entity, Cb, that is a natural referent of a
pronoun in the next clause and (2) there is a small distinguished set of entities
CJ that may be referenced pronominally as well.
To interpret this research on attention in terms of text and context, what it
says, in part, is that context should not be considered a homogeneous concept
soup, but rather, a dynamically changing structure of concepts, in which some
are lllore accessible than others at a given time and may permit more inferential
operations than others in ways that reflect not just the organization of long-term
memory but local and global properties of the particular text.
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3 The Phenoll1enon of this and that
Raving considered what theories of discourse provide for describing changes in
context, I want to move on to characterize more precisely what it means, in
Strunk & White's terms, "to refer to the complete sense of a preceding sentence
or clause" , as in the following two examples.
Example 1
It's always been presumed that when the glaciers receded, the area
got very hot. The Folsum men couldn't adapt, and they died out.
That's what is supposed to have happened. It's the textbook dogma.
But it's wrong. They were human and smart. They adapted their
weapons and culture, and they survived.
Example 2
The tools come from the development of new types of computing de-
vices. Just as we thought of intelligence in terms of servomechanism
in the 1950s, and in terms of sequential computers in the sixties
and seventies, we are now beginning to think in terms of parallel
computers, in which tens of thousands of processors work together.
This is not a deep, philosophical shift, but it is of great practical
importance, since it is now possible to study large emergent systems
experimentally. [Rill88, p.176]
In neither of these examples, do the pronouns this and that refer to discourse
entities introduced into the listener's discourse model by noun phrases. The stuff
of their interpretation - which comes from material introduced clausally - is the
phenomenon I shall now try to characterize more precisely.
The first piece of evidence I want to introduce consists of distributional
statistics. I took six texts written by six different authors and tabulated in-
stances of subsequent reference that used either of the pronouns it, this or that. 6
Of 96 instances of pronominal reference to clausal material found in these texts,
only 15 ("'"16%) used the pronoun it while the other 81 (""'84%) used either
this or that (19 instances of that and 62 instances of this). On the other hand,
looking at all instances of pronominal reference to discourse entities evoked by
6The six texts were the first chapter of the novel Summons to Memphis by Peter Taylor,
Ballentine Books, 1986; W.D. Hillis' essay, "Intelligence as as Emergent Behavior", Daedalus,
Winter 1988, pp.175-189; an editorial from The Guardian,15 December TLS, 23-29 October
1987, pp.1163-1164; Phil Williams' review of a set of books on disarmament, "New threats, new
lllldertainties", TLS, 20-26 November 1987, p.1270; and a technical report "An Architecture
for Intelligent Reactive Systems" by Leslie Kaebling, SRI Int'l, Menlo Park CA.
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noun phrases, of 81 such references, 79 (1"V98%) used it while only 2 (1"V2%) used
this or that. (Passonneau [Schiff84a, Schiff84b] reports a similar distribution for
it and that in spoken discourse. She does not report results for this.) Given
such results, it makes sense to call the phenomenon discourse deixis.
There is an important reason for confining my investigation to written (pri-
marily objective) expositions rather than including spoken texts as well. That
is that spoken text makes additional use of this and that in ways that objective
written text rarely does. For example, in first-person accounts (which are very
common in speech, less so in written objective texts), narrators use this and
that in ways that reflect some subjective notion of nearness to or distance from
themselves [AnKe85]. In addition, spoken texts employ stress - in particular,
contrastive stress - which is well-known for altering what it is that a referring
phrase can be used to refer to. Since the purpose of this paper is to argue what
is necessary for an account of this and that, not for what is sufficient, it seems
to me permissable to confine n1Y investigation to written text.
The second piece of evidence concerns what it is that the pronouns this and
that are referring to. Consider the following example:
Example 3
There's two houses you might be interested in:
House A is in Palo Alto. It's got 3 bedrooms and 2 baths, and
was built in 1950. It's on a quarter acre, with a lovely garden, and
the owner is asking $425K. But that's all I know about it.
House B is in Portola Vally. It's got 3 bedrooms, 4 baths and
a kidney-shaped pool, and was also built in 1950. It's on 4 acres
of steep wooded slope, with a view of the mountains. The owner is
asking $600K. I heard all this from a real-estate friend of mine.
Is that enough information for you to decide which to look at?
What I want to show is that in this passage, that in the second paragraph
does not refer to House A (although all instances of it do): rather it refers to
the packet of information about House A presented there. Similarly (all) this
in the third paragraph does not refer to House B (although again, all instances
of it do): rather it refers to the packet of information about House B presented
there. That in the fourth paragraph refers to the combined packet of information
about the two houses taken together.
That in each case it is a packet of information that this and that are accessing
and not the houses, can be seen by interleaving the two descriptions, a technique
often used in discourse when comparing two items:
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Example 4
There's two houses you might be interested in:
House A is in Palo Alto, House B in Portola Vally. Both were
built in 1950, and both have 3 bedrooms. House A has 2 baths,
and B, 4. House B also has a kidney-shaped pool. House A is on
a quarter acre, with a lovely garden, while House B is on 4 acres
of steep wooded slope, with a view of the mountains. The owner of
House A is asking $425K. The owner of House B is asking $600K.
# That's all I know about House A. # This I heard from a real-estate
friend of mine.
Is that enough information for you to decide which to look at?
Here houses A and B have been described together, and the failure of that
and this to refer successfully in the second paragraph to the same referents as in
Example 3 indicates that it is not the houses being referred to or what one has
learned about them from the text. Rather, this and that must be interpreted
as specifying what was said about each house, viewed as a thing unto itself -
a packet's worth of information - that is, the mental correlate of a discourse
segment, which I will call a sequent.7 In Example 4, the packaging is different
than in Example 3, even though the content is the same. In Example 4, there
is only one packet of information about both houses together, hence the failure
of the individual pointers. The only deictic that works is the final that, which
successfully refers to the information conveyed about both houses together.
As noted in Section 2, discourse segment is usually taken to be a recursive
structure. Thus my third piece of evidence that this and that specify sequents
comes from examples in which successive instances of this and/or that appear
to derive their interpretation from segments at different levels of embedding, as
in the following example.
Example 5
... it should be possible to identify certain functions as being un-
necessary for thought by studying patients whose cognitive abilities
are unaffected by locally confined damage to the brain. {lFor exam-
ple, binocular stereo fusion is known to take place in a specific area
of the cortex near the back of the head. {2Patients with damage
to this area of the cortex have visual handicaps but {a [they] show
no obvious impairment in their ability to think.a}2} This suggests
that stereo fusion is not necessary for thought. I} This is a simple
71 am using the term sequent in very broad analogy to its use in logic to denote a structured
collection of propositions in which one subset "proves" the other. I would not be averse to
alternative suggestions.
13
example, and the conclusion is not surprising.... [Hi1l88, p. 185]
Here brackets have been added to indicate discourse segments, with sub-
scripts indicating the depth of embedding. The most likely interpretation of
the first this is the observation that visual cortex-damaged patients have visual
handicaps but no impairment to their thinking abilities (i.e., the interpretation
of segment 2), while the most likely interpretation of the second this is the whole
"brain damage" example (i.e., the interpretation of segment 1).8
The final piece of evidence I want to present concerns the range of features
that must be associated with the mental representation of a discourse segment
for subsequent reference by this or that. These include: its speech act (B1 in
Example 6); its form of expression (B2); the event it specifies, if it specifies an
event (B3); the action it specifies, if the event it specifies involves an action
(B4); as well as its complete sense (B5).
Example 6
A: Hey, management has promoted Fred to second vice president.
B1: That's a lie.
B2: That's a funny way to describe the situation.
B3: When did that happen?
B4: That's a weird thing for them to do.
B5: Oh, that's why his wife is so happy.
4 Resolving Discourse Deictics
Having characterized the phenomenon I am calling discourse deixis and what
context minimally has to provide for its interpretation (i.e., what I am calling
sequents - mental correlates of discourse segments), I want to move on to discuss
the interpretive process itself. First I will discuss constraints on the process, and
then how it differs from the process of interpreting anaphoric pronouns. Finally
I will discuss where in the process differences between this and that come into
play.
8Segm.ent 3 alone might be thought to provide the correct interpretation if the first this
were followed by something like "is obvious when they are asked to solve word problems
presented orally." (cf. Section 4) It has also occurred to me that Example 5 can be thought
of as a topic-comment construction in which the topic takes more than one clause to describe.
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4.1 Interpretive Constraints and their Application
In this section, I will argue that the process that provides interpretations for
this and that is subject to two separate sets of constraints - one attentional, the
other semantic - namely,
1. the interpretation of this and that must come from a sequent corresponding
to a discourse segment on the right frontier (cf. Section 2);
2. their interpretation must be compatible with that of their matrix clause.
My evidence that the only sequents that can provide interpretations for dis-
course deictics are ones associated with discourse segments on the right frontier
consists of (a) it being true of the 81 sequent-referring instances of this and
that found in the six texts mentioned above and (b) the oddity of examples
like the following variation of Example 3. (The clauses are numbered for later
discussion. )
Example 3'
(1) There's two houses you might be interested in:
(2) House A is in Palo Alto. (3) It's got three bedrooms and two
baths, and was built in 1950. (4) It's on a quarter acre, with a lovely
garden, and (5) the owner is asking $425K.
(6) House B is in Portola Vally. (7) It's got three bedrooms, four
baths and a kidney-shaped pool, and (8) was also built in 1950. (9)
It's on 4 acres of steep wooded slope, with a view of the mountains.
(10) The owner is asking $600K. (11) I heard all this from a real-
estate friend of mine. (12) #But that's all I know about House A.
(13) Is that enough information for you to decide which to look
at?
What is at issue is the interpretation of that in clause 12. The rest of clause 12
constrains the interpretation of that to be information about House A. However
its position in the text, assuming that it is unstressed, is only compatible with
its being interpreted in one of very few ways, including:
• something related to clause 11, as in "But that's all she said." (where that
is interpretable as referring to the same thing as "all this about House B
that I heard from a real-estate friend of mine" ;
• something related to the interpretation of clauses 2-11 (the information
regarding both houses, similar to the perceived interpretation of that in
15
Info on
two houses
of interest
"But that's all I know.....
Info on House A
(2-5)
Info on House B
(6-11)
Figure 5: Discourse Segmentation at the point of processing "But that's all ... "
clause 13.
Schematically, one might represent the discourse segmentation at the point in
the processing that roughly as in Figure 5. The oddity of Example 3' comes frolll
the conflicting demands of text position and clause predication in the process
of resolving that.
Again let me emphasize that I am only considering written text and un-
stressed instances of this and that. It is well-known that stressing a pronoun
can shift its preferred referent. In the case of clause 12, stressing that, reinforced
by information conveyed by the rest of the sentence, allows it to be interpreted
as the block of information about House A, even though that sequent is no
longer being attended to.
Notice that even if it is true that unstressed this and that must be identified
with a discourse segment on the right frontier, there is still an ambiguity as to
which segment. To see this, consider the first part of Example 5 as a "discourse
completion task" .
Example 5
... it should be possible to identify certain functions as being un-
necessary for thought by studying patients whose cognitive abilities
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are unaffected by locally confined damage to the brain. For exam-
ple, binocular stereo fusion is known to take place in a specific area
of the cortex near the back of the head. Patients with damage to
this area of the cortex have visual handicaps but show no obvious
impairment in their ability to think. This ....
At this point in the discourse, there are many possible ways of completing the
last sentence, among them -
a. This is obvious when they are asked to solve word problems presented
orally.
b. This suggests that stereo fusion is not necessary for thought.
c. This is only a simple example, and the conclusion is not surprising.
In (a), it makes most sense to interpret this as specifying the proposition that
patients with damage to the particular area of the cortex near the back of
the head show no obvious impairment in their ability to think. In (b) this
is identifiable with the more inclusive claim that patients with damage to the
particular area of the cortex near the back of the head have visual handicaps
but show no obvious impairment in their ability to think. Finally, in (c) it
makes most sense to interpret this more inclusively as the entire example about
binocular stereo vision. How the listener chooses to interpret the deictic depends
on what is compatible with the meaning of the rest of the sentence. As with
other types of ambiguity, there may be a default preference for one particular
form of construal over the others (cf. [CS85, Steed88]) but it is easily over-ridden
by context.
This ambiguity as to what sequent the deictic pronouns this and that are
identified with seems to me very similar to the ambiguity associated with what
some linguists (cf. [Lyons79]) see as the logically prior use of deixis for pointing
within a shared physical context, as in Figure 6.
In Figure 6, this could be interpreted as either the business, the pictures, or
the physical gallery.9 Both Quine [Quine71] and Miller [Miller82] have observed
in this regard that all pointing is ambiguous: the intended demonstratum of a
pointing gesture can be any of the infinite number of points "intersected" by
the gesture or any of the structures encompassing those points. (Or, one might
add, any interpretation of those structures.) The ambiguity here as to how large
a segment on the right frontier is providing an interpretation for this or that is
very similar.
9Presumably Al Junior will have enough context to resolve this more precisely, or he will
be smart enough to ask.
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Someday, this will
all be yours
r\ ~
l'
"
AIls A-I Art Gallery
Figure 6: Spatial Deixis
As I noted at the beginning of this section, a second constraint on the inter-
pretation of a discourse deictic is that it be compatible with the interpretation
of its matrix clause. The interpretation of some sequent as a whole may not be
so compatible. The process that provides interpretations for discourse deictics
must be able to coerce [HMSE88,MS88] a sequent to one of its properties, as in
Example 6 (repeated here).
Example 6
A: Hey, management has promoted Fred to second vice president.
Bl: That's a lie.
B2: That's a funny way to describe the situation.
B3: Did that happen before or after the scandel broke?
B4: That's a weird thing for them to do.
B5: Oh, that's why his wife is so happy.
Moreover, since this and that can also be interpreted as some discourse entity
that is explicitly part of a sequent, as in Examples 7 and 8 below, the process
that interprets discourse deictics must also be able to do such "whole-part"
coercions as well.
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Example 7
A: Hey, management has promoted Fred to second vice president.
Bl: Oh, that's who's replacing Harry.
B2: That's a very important post.
B3: Oh!, that's who we have to blame then.
Example 8
A: Bob got a 90 on the exam. Betsy got a 95, and Gerry got a 93.
B: Well, that's who I would have expected to do well.
4.2 Processing Differences between Anaphors and Deic-
tics
If one looks at the linguistics literature, it is clear that many linguists believe
that deixis is different from anaphora. Ehlich [Ehli82] makes the clearest state-
ment of what he takes the difference to be. Deictics he sees as:
a linguistic instrument for achieving focusing of the hearer's atten-
tion towards a specific item which is part of the respective deictic
space
whereas anaphors are
a linguistic instrument for having the hearer continue (sustain) a
previously established focus towards a specific item on which he has
oriented his attention earlier.
As a linguist though, Ehlich does not give a precise definition of "deictic space" ,
"previously established focus" or what it means to "orient one's attention to-
wards an item". However, the vocabulary of processing discussed here can be
used to give substance to Ehlich's distinction.
Following [GJW83], I assume that in processing the bulk of anaphoric pro-
nouns in text 10, the language processor makes use of a distinguished entity Cb
and a small set of only slightly less distinguished entities CJ. It offers the Cb
as the most natural referent for a pronoun and after that,ll the members of
CJ. If these local, highly salient assignments fail, conscious reasoning begins or
10not the ones linguists write papers about
lleither becuase Cb is incompatible with the role assigned to it or because there is more
than one pronoun in the clause
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confusion sets in, as in interpreting "they" in the following example:
Example 9
"One difficulty for many young people in New York City is that while
part-time jobs tend to be concentrated in Manhattan, they tend to
be concentrated in other boroughs, and that makes it difficult to
work after school." [New York Times, August 14, 1988]
The point is, in normal circumstances, the processing of anaphoric pronouns
appears to involve a very local, highly constrained pair of data structures, Cb
and Cf. It is not unreasonable to assume that a number/gender compatible pro-
noun (or zero-anaphor, in languages like Japanese) is immediately interpreted
as specifying the Cb. Any later-discovered incompatibility in that assignment
switches the processor to members of Cf and then to conscious reasoning or
confusion.
This is in contrast with the processing of discourse deictics. First, as shown
above, the space of likely referents for deictics is different and much larger than
for anaphoric pronouns, being any sequent corresponding to a segment on the
right frontier, plus any property of such a sequent or any entity within it. 12
Moreover, most instances of this and that in text occur as the first noun
phrase in a clause. 13 At this point, the only knowable constraint on the in-
terpretation of one of these deictics is that it derives from a segment on the
right frontier. If one assumes that the language processor does not wait for all
constraints to come in before interpreting a discourse deictic, it must be able to
develop and make use of a partial interpretation based on whatever constraints
it has. I see this as analogous to spatio-temporal uses of this and that, where a
person may first recognize a general pointing gesture, and then tries to figure
out what is being pointed to specifically, based on what the speaker says about
it and perhaps general heuristics about what might be worth pointing to.
This need for partial interpretations that can be constrained as more of
the clause is processed further distinguishes the interpretation of deictics differs
from that of anaphora. In Section 5 however, I will present evidence for a par-
ticular link between discourse deictics and anaphoric pronouns, which will give
substance to Ehlich's assertion that deictics "achieve focussing of the hearer's
attention" .
12 This provides a definition for Ehlich's "deictic space".
130f the 81 clausally-referring instances of this and that pronouns I tabulated, 60 (f'o..J74%)
were in subject position in standard SVO clauses, 19 were post-verbal noun phrases, and 2
were preposed adverbials (e.g. "after that"). Hence ,...",77% were first noun phrases. This is
not the case with anaphoric pronouns.
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Notice that this step of further constraining a pointing gesture also allows
for a uniform treatment of this and do this (that and do that). That is, given a
preposed this or that, a listener may not be able to determine right off (or for
some ways into the sentence) whether it serves as the object of do or it plays
some other role in the clause: slhe cannot tell until slhe reaches the gap (or
"trace") co-indexed with it, as in Example 10.
Example 10
1. Gladys told Sam last night that Fred was a complete jerk.
2a. Anyway, that's what Fred believes that Gladys said Ti.
2b. Anyway, that's what Fred believes that Gladys did Ti .14
There are two ways out of this for listeners:
1. they can commit themselves to one interpretation (as action, situation,
or entity) and retract it later if it turns out to be incompatible with the
syntax, or
2. assuming actions are properties of their respective events, listeners can
take the interpretation of a discourse segment on the right frontier and
coerce that sequent into a component action if that is what is required by
syntax.
The latter seems to me more likely.
4.3 Differences between this and that
Nothing in the interpretive process so far described makes a distinction between
this and that. In the many cases where the two appear interchangeable (cf.
Example 11), there appears to be no difference in what they can access.
Example 11
a. Patients with damage to this area of the cortex have visual handicaps but
show no obvious impairment in their ability to think. This suggests that
14In an e-mail message I received, I found a preposed that serving as both the object of do
and the object of a regular verb:
Several universities have made computer science a separate school. But that is
not necessarily what we want or even what we could do.
This example can be taken as a "speech" error or as additional evidence that at some level,
both forms are considered the same.
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stereo fusion is not necessary for thought.
b. Patients with damage to this area of the cortex have visual handicaps but
show no obvious impairment in their ability to think. That suggests that
stereo fusion is not necessary for thought.
In the cases where the two are not interchangeable (cf. Example 12), the
reason for the oddness does not seem to follow from any difference in accessibility
(i.e., an ability to identify the intended referent), but rather from some kind of
clash between the "psychological distance" inlplied by the deictic (nearIfar) and
the respondent's felt "psychological distance" from its referent. (In Example 12,
it seems reasonable for B to specify A's statement as that - distant from B -
but odd for B to specify it as this - close to B.)
Example 12
A: Hey, management has promoted Fred to second vice president.
B1: That's a funny way to describe the situation.
B2: # This is a funny way to describe the situation.
Compare Example 12 to the following example where there is no "attitudinal
clash". Here, it seems reasonable for B to consider the event of Fred's promotion
either as something "psychologically" close to him or as something far away.
Example 13
A: Hey, management has promoted Fred to second vice president.
B1: Wow! That's wonderful for us.
B2: Wow! This is wonderful for us.
Thus I would claim that this nearIfar deictic dimension (with spatial nearIfar
extended to "attitudinal" near/far) only comes into play either in filtering pos-
sible referents or even later, in attributing speaker attitude towards the one
chosen. (Robin Lakoff [Lakoff] discusses psychological distance in her not on
this and that, but does not tie it in with processing.)
Here is some additional suggestive anecdotal evidence regarding "attitudinal
aspects" that other researchers might like to consider:
• In technical reports and conference papers I have looked at, this predom-
inates strongly over that. Here people are presenting their own research
results and arguing for their own theories .
• In the few newspaper editorials and op-ed columns I have looked at, that
predominates strongly over this. These editorials and columns have all
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been critical of some government policy.
• In one of the technical reports, this appears 13 times in positive clauses
and once in a negative clause ("If it doesn't know this, ... "). That, on
the other hand, is used only twice, both times in negative clauses ("since
that has not yet been done, ... " and "Worse than that, ... ").
I will have nothing more to say about these observations in the current paper,
as they are peripheral to my main interest in attention and processing.
Before I close this section though, let me show how the current account also
explains the observation that listeners, when quizzed on what a particular this
or that refers to, may vary widely in their response.
As noted, a sequent can correspond to the interpretation of more than one
natural-language clause. However, those clauses themselves may not be retained
in the listener's memory. In such a case, describing the referent of a particular
discourse deictic would be a constructive act and hence subject to variability,
including how much the listener chooses to describe explicitly.15 This variability
goes beyond any ambiguity in how inclusive a segment provides the referent.
To summarize, in Section 2, I argued for the existence of sequents - mental
correlates of discourse segments - as providing referents for deictic pronouns in
text. In this section, I have argued that determining the referent of a discourse
deictic makes use of two different sets of constraints - one attentional, the other
semantic. While a listener is aware of the at tentional constraints right away,
more of the clause may have to be processed before semantic constraints become
clear as well. The consequences for automatic text understanding systems are
that:
1. such systems must build up an individual representation of each chunk of
text taken to be a segment (i.e., a sequent is not just context for pronoun
and noun phrase interpretation);
2. they must be able to construct and reason with partial interpretations and
perform the type of reasoning that has been called coercion.
15Schuster [Schus88] makes a similar point with respect to text describing a sequence of
actions related by Goldman's [Gold75] generates relation: if a that follows, when asked about
its referent, the listener may either describe it as the entire relation or just the final action.
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5 Discourse Entities and Activation
So far my discussion of discourse deixis has primarily been in terms of only one
of the three discourse notions mentioned in Section 2 - discourse segments. Now
I want to present some data relevant to the other two - discourse entities and
activation - and argue that it provides additional evidence for:
• another relationship between discourse segments and discourse entities;
• a rough partition of a listener's attention into
those concepts slhe can be taken as actively attending to, that can
be specified with an anaphoric pronoun. (These I will call centered,
following [GJW83].)
those that slhe is also attending to, but only as background to the
centered entities, that can be specified with a deictic pronoun or noun
phrase. (These I will call background.)
There is some overlap between these two, resulting in speakers' abilities to
refer to some entities with either deictic pronouns or anaphoric pronouns.
• a sharp contrast between the above-mentioned background concepts, which
can be specified deictically, and inferrable concepts, which can only be
taken as associated with something that the listener is attending to and
can only be specified with a definite noun phrase.
Evidence for the first two points comes from a common pattern of usage
in which specification using this or that is followed by co-specification using it.
This is illustrated in the following examples:
Example 1
It's always been presumed that when the glaciers receded, the area
got very hot. The Folsum men couldn't adapt, and they died out.
That's what is supposed to have happened. It's the textbook
dogma. But it's wrong. They were human and smart. They adapted
their weapons and culture, and they survived.
Example 2
The tools come from the development of new types of computing de-
vices. Just as we thought of intelligence in terms of servomechanism
in the 1950s, and in terms of sequential computers in the sixties
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and seventies, we are now beginning to think in terms of parallel
computers, in which tens of thousands of processors work together.
This is not a deep, philosophical shift, but it is of great practical
importance, since it is now possible to study large emergent systems
experimentally. [Rill88, p.176]
Example 15
I don't think this can be taken seriously either. It would mean in
effect that we had learned nothing at all from the evaluation, and
anyway we can't afford the resources it would entail.
Example 16
The Texas attorney general said that the McDonald's announcement
represented "a calculated effort to make the public think that they
were doing this out of the goodness of their heart when, in fact, they
were doing it because of pressure from our office". [Philadelphia
Inquirer, 13 June 1986]
One can account for this pattern in the following way:
(1) The sequents associated with discourse segments on the right frontier,
while active (explicitly verbalized) play the part of background to the discourse
entities that the listener is most attending to. It is only this small set of centered
entities that are accessible anaphorically.
(2) However, just as this and that can be used in pointing to parts of the
background in spatio-temporal deixis, they can be used to access the sequents
associated with segments on the right frontier in their role as background to
these centered entities.
(3) Once background material has been referenced with a deictic pronoun,
it becomes a centered discourse entity, simply by virtue of its mention as a noun
phrase in the clause.
(4) Once centered, the normal situation for centered entities holds, and the
resulting entity is accessible to reference by an anaphoric pronoun.
Note that I do not mean to imply that one cannot refer deictically to the same
thing more than once - that by being specified deictically and hence focussed,
something is removed in some sense from the background. Multiple co-referring
deictics are certainly possible, for example
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Example 17
They wouldn't hear to my giving up my career in New York. That
was where I belonged. That was where I had to be to do my work.
[Peter Taylor, A Summons to Memphis, p.68]
Example 18
By this time of course I accepted Holly's doctrine that our old peo-
ple must be not merely forgiven all their injustices and unconscious
cruelties in their roles as parents but that any selfishness on their
parts had actually been required of them if they were to remain
whole human beings and not become merely guardian robots of the
young. This was something to be remembered, not forgotten. This
was something to be accepted and even welcomed, not forgotten or
forgiven. [Peter Taylor, A Summons to Memphis, p.217]
But this pattern is the exception rather than the rule - a literary device
marking the clauses as strongly parallel - comments on the same thing. (In
cases like Example 17, the two clauses could have been presented in either
order, which does not appear to be the case in the more common pattern of
reference described above.) All it implies is that even something in the active
background is specified deictically, it is not removed from there. On the other
hand, it does become a centered entity and, as such, the easiest, least marked
way of specifying it is with an anaphoric pronoun.
My third point - that deictics provide evidence for distinguishing background
concepts from inferrable ones - comes from looking at deictic noun phrases. I
have shown that a deictic pronoun can only be interpreted as referring to a
sequent associated with a discourse segment on the right frontier, or a property
of that sequent, or a discourse entity explicitly part of it - that is, a concept
taken to be attended to but nevertheless background. The same holds for deictic
noun phrases. This distinguishes them from definite noun phrases, which can
also be interpreted as referring to things that are merely inferrable from the
current situation - what Chafe has called semi-active concepts - for example
Example 19
a. John and Mary decided to go on a picnic.
b. While they remembered most things, they forgot to put the picnic supplies
in the cooler.
c. So when they got to the park, the beer was warm.
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Here the beer is easily interpretable as referring to an entity corresponding
to the beer that is part of John and Mary's picnic supplies, where the picnic
supplies are part of the current situation. By contrast, a similar example with
a deictic noun phrase sounds definitely odd:
Example 20
a. John and Mary decided to go on a picnic.
b. While they remembered most things, they forgot to put the picnic supplies
in the cooler.
c. #So when they got to the park, that beer was warm.16
Another example illustrates this constrast in a different way: given a context
that admits the use of either a definite noun phrase or a deictic noun phrase,
the two noun phrases will pick out different referents, even if their descriptive
content is the same - for example,
Example 21
a. Some files are superfiles.
b. To screw up some one's directory, look at the files.
c. If one of them is a superfile, delete it.
Example 22
a. Son1e files are superfiles.
b. To screw up some one's directory, look at those files.
c. They will tell you which of his files is absolutely vital to him.
In Example 21, the definite noun phrase the files is interpreted as referring
to an entity corresponding to the files in that person's directory - that is, to
a in/errable concept associated with something currently being attended to. In
Example 22 on the other hand, the deictic noun phrase those files is interpreted
as referring to an entity corresponding to the files that are superfiles, i.e., to a
discourse entity explicitly in the interpretation of a sequent associated with a
segment on the right frontier - part of the background.
Thus there is a difference between concepts being attended to, even as bac-
ground, and those that can only be inferred.17
16 A similar point is made in [Lakoff], although she does not provide any explanation.
17With respect to Chafe's proposal [Chafe87] discussed in Section 2, this argues against
simply lumping together concepts that have been mentioned explicitly but have not been
refreshed and ones that are only inferrable. While Chafe is correct in taking both to be
accessible to unmodified definite noun phrases, deictic noun phrases are limited to the former.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have proposed and argued for a process-based account of deictic
pronouns in text. Its main contributions lie in having (1) enhanced the stature
of discourse segments and their interpretations (sequents); (2) further specified
properties of attention in discourse; (3) uncovered additional relationships be-
tween the notions of discourse entity, discourse segment, and attention; and (4)
provided some meat to the intuition that deictics are different from anaphors.
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